Sorry about my bad english.

However, the main issue about fatigue is that pilot do not like to admit that they are suffering from it. We need to open a clear path to every employee for them to feel safe to admit that they feel tired and need to rest. The airlines need to understand this as well and do the necessary adjustment without placing in risk the pilot’s career.

Typhoon is misconcieved. This isn’t hindsight, I said as much at a lecture ar Warton about its predecessor. Already – in 1985! – it was blatant that radar signatures had to be reduced, not minimised with huge maintenance penalties but kept low by simple, cheap strategies like internal weapons stowage, lots of inbuilt range and twin or no fins.

The initial version wasn’t completely hopeless, but expedients essential to rectify defects – that were predictable so might better have been avoided – swiftly rendered it electronically filthy. ‘Overload’ tanks. Missiles on external racks that approximated to radar reflectors.

Complicating everything, it was bodged into not only everything for all men but any old thing four nations could dream up. The Spitfire was mentioned – except there wasn’t a Spitfire, there were versions, by the dozen moreover.

Which is one reason Typhoon costs too much. So enormously much that it cannot sanely be exposed to ground fire. As defence staffs everywhere know perfectly well.

If more overseas sales are achieved, it will be because the opposition is no better, and through the support not of HMG but the poor, impoverished, British taxpayer.

We’ve now created a group for everyone to share their thoughts and experiences so please join and help move the industry forward

http://www.linkedin.com/groups?home=&gid=4935511&trk=anet_ug_hm&goback=%2Egmp_3216172%2Egmp_4935511

Bob Clark

Reading between the lines I gather the EU is not too happy with the decision to go with the all solid Ariane 6. This is a step backwards not forwards in technological progress. It has the advantage, however, of providing a lot of work to the ESA member countries. It is clear then this supersedes even cutting costs.

But a solution to these problems could be made by the EU following the model NASA is instituting. NASA’s commercial crew program is progressing nicely towards the goal of providing manned spaceflight at reduced costs by promoting “commercial” space. Then the EU could open up to European industry to produce, perhaps with seed money, manned launchers and capsules/spacecraft as *privately financed*.

To encourage this financial investment, and risk, the EU could make the assurance of using such launchers for European manned flights as long as they are at least comparable in price to the Russian Soyuz. The Russians are currently charging $200 million for three seats, which is about what the full Ariane 5 costs per launch. But a manned capable launcher can be done at about a quarter the size of the Ariane 5, so this should be doable.

Another key factor that must be kept in mind is that SpaceX has shown that by private financing 90% (!) can be cut from the development cost of a launcher. This means a launcher the needed size can be done for a few hundred million dollars in development costs instead of several billion dollars, quite a significant difference.

The very same type of program of course would work in the UK to give Britain its own independent manned spaceflight ability with minimal cost to the British government in development costs.

Bob Clark

The best monitoring in the world is not going to make the pilot better. Not teach them how to fly when the autopilot kicks off.
We take checkrides with automation. We are no longer tested on our piloting skills. When something breaks, the plane screams. How important is monitoring across the ocean?

We watch for traffic, and don’t get lost. Anything else in the planes flashes a warning. The problem is that no body teaches how to read weather. Performance issues. We are trained how to punch buttons, and we fly the same way.

The two accidents mentioned… Colgan and AF… do we think that better monitoring would have changed the outcome of either of those accidents? I don’t.

The real problem is with training and checking. The day the FAA decided to conduct type-rides solely on the automation, was the day proficiency went the wrong way. As long as nothing is going wrong with the plane…. we don’t have a problem.

The kids coming up are being trained for their basics on the automation. There is a solution. But it costs money so therefore we talk about things that don’t really matter.

Excellent points for discussion.

Just been trolling through some ‘aircraft stuff’ & saw this. Have been reading your Dad’s book which I found in Mum’s stuff after she recently passed away. Give me a shout, it would be interesting to catch up.

I don’t think anyone in the industry will be enjoying this but there seemed to be an overriding emphasis on problems with Airbus and other european aircraft in the past. Of course the press are doing what they always do in wringing out every dramatic angle possible from the situation.

It is odd that when I was working, Boeing were ultra conservative and seemed to operate a evolutionary design policy rather than a revolutionary approach. I see the 787 primarily as an evolutionary design as composites have been gradually introduced over time and on many other airframes, including Boeing. It is the revolutionary aspect of the design and the big driver towards lower operating costs, that seems to have caused this serious situation.

Perhaps it will drive battery technology, enabling these applications to be common place in years to come. Just as De Havilland paid a high price for introducing jet air travel so Boeing seems to to be paying a high price for this design decision.

I am sure the problem will be overcome but is unlikely to be without its long term costs. I live in Europe but have worked for much of my career for US aerospace companies and wish Boeing success in finding an early long term solution. I suspect, however, in the near future it will focus aircraft designers rather more towards the evolutionary end of the risk spectrum.

My earliest recollection of media hysteria – I use this word deliberately – occurred in the late 1940′s. Then the ubiquitous Dakota was the target. Subsequent statistical analysis revealed that more Dakotas suffered incidents or accidents simply because there were so many more of them flying that any other aircraft type. In consequence the figures showed that, pro rata, their safety record was no worse than than any other.

Not long after that came the Comet tragedies when design misconceptions were shown to be the prime cause. At that time, because of the rapid development of aircraft to date (and short operating life expectancy in the war years) metal fatigue had never been seen as an issue.

Another aspect of aviation was the semming “gung-ho” aspect when regular flying of new aircraft was largely undertaken by men who had survived air combats that many of their comrades had not survived. Prototype aircraft loss was relatively commonplace: remember the film “Sound Barrier”? To illustrate this there were losses of HP Hermes, AVRO Tudor, Bristol Britannia, DH Trident, BAC 1-11 and many military types as well.